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Abstract: Wild hogs (Sus scrofa) are an invasive, exotic species that has spread through much 
of  the United States through anthropogenic means. Many states have laws and regulations 
with the intent of preventing the illegal importation, introduction, and establishment of wild 
swine populations. However, in many cases, these laws have been ineff ectual at stopping the 
anthropogenic spread of wild swine. To assess the risk for moving wild hogs, we examined 
various wild hog-related laws throughout the United States and assessed the potential reward 
for their illegal movement of releasing hogs for hunting purposes. We found that fi nes ranged 
from $0 to $10,000, with the mean minimum fi ne of $1,085 and a mean maximum fi ne of 
$2,708. The mean cost of a single-day hunting trip was $448; however, this varied widely 
among states. In many cases, potential rewards, as demonstrated by the economic utility, for 
releasing wild hogs far outweighed the monetary risk from getting caught. States with few or 
no wild hogs and weak laws and/or fi nes are at a substantial risk for the illegal importation of 
wild hogs. To reduce the potential for the spread of wild hogs, agencies should concentrate 
on increasing monetary fi nes or increasing the perceptions that this illegal activity will be 
successfully detected and prosecuted. 
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Invasive, exotic species such as wild hogs 
(Sus scrofa) have spread across the United 
States through anthropogenic means (Mayer 
and Brisbin 2008). The initial release of hogs 
into the wild as free-ranging food items later 
became valuable big game species for hunting. 
Some populations were introduced into 
captivity for penned hunts, while others were 
released on the landscape for a more traditional 
hunting experience. The popularity of hunting 
hogs has resulted in translocated populations 
throughout the United States, especially in 
areas with low or no hog populations (Bevins et 
al. 2014). To address this, many state laws and 
regulations aim to reduce legal importation of 
wild swine. Federal regulations also prohibit 
the movement of undocumented swine (9 CFR 
Part 71.19). However, these laws have often 
been ineff ectual to stop the anthropogenic 
spread of wild swine. A continual infl ux of 
illegally imported and released wild hogs will 
hamper current eff orts at eradication.
Hunting hogs can be an enjoyable activity 
that leads to an increased desire to hunt. This 
activity can become more expensive if hogs are 
not present where the hunter lives. Providing 
monetary incentives can be a powerful force 
that aff ects the decision-making process to 
complete a task (McNeely 1988), but many 
people will not complete tasks that are onerous, 
diffi  cult, or time consuming. Instead, they will 
often seek loopholes or otherwise avoid the 
task while still qualifying for the incentive. 
This has often occurred when incentives have 
been off ered to reduce populations of various 
nuisance wildlife populations, including wild 
hogs (Choquenot et al. 1996, Singleton et al. 
2007, Bevins et al. 2014). 
There are positive economic incentives for 
hunters to go to other states or other parts of 
their own state, obtain a small number of hogs, 
and release them on or near their property 
(Figure 1). Once a population is established, 
hunting the hogs can occur any time. As an 
incentive, hunters save money by not having 
to drive elsewhere to hunt hogs, especially if 
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hunting on a frequent basis. Another incentive 
is that wild hogs can potentially be used to 
increase the value of a hunting lease or expand 
the lease from a single season, such as a deer 
season, to multiple seasons and multiple 
game animals. Local hunters may also use the 
opportunity to hunt hogs to establish a for-
profi t guide service (Bevins et al. 2014). 
While most states have wild hogs (Bevins et 
al. 2014), many states do not have populations 
that are large enough to hunt on a regular basis, 
causing hunters to spend large amounts of time 
in pursuit of hogs with litt le return. In some 
states, such as Indiana, Ohio, and Illinois, hog 
populations are so fragmented that a hunter in 
the state may have to drive for hours to a general 
location where hogs have been reported. 
Hunters also must fi nd a private landowner 
willing to allow them access to their property 
to hunt hogs; many are not willing to do so 
because of potential property damage from 
hog hunters. In states where hog populations 
are present, but at low levels, hog hunters may 
have to go to other states to hunt successfully. 
Some hunters and landowners may recognize 
the monetary benefi ts of illegally introducing 
hogs to their property for future hunting 
opportunities or future profi ts. 
To prevent undesirable behavior from 
hunters and landowners, lawmakers often use 
negative incentives to guide behavior (Piliavin 
et al. 1986). In many cases, states and federal 
agencies have laws and regulations that, at 
least at fi rst glance, provide a disincentive to 
illegally importing feral hogs. But for laws and 
regulations to be an eff ective deterrent, fi nes 
or other punishment must be high enough 
to off set the potential gain from the illegal 
activity or to cause substantial fi nancial harm 
to the perpetrator (Ehrlich 1972, Rechtschaff en 
1998, Garoupa 2001). There also has to be a 
high perceived risk of gett ing caught and the 
potential for being successfully prosecuted 
(Garoupa 2001). Unfortunately, the eff ect of 
laws on the potential to reduce the introduction 
of wild hogs has not been examined or 
summarized. Therefore, we conducted a utility 
analysis for importing and releasing wild hogs, 
where utility is defi ned as the ability of an object 
to satisfy a need or want (Piliavin et al. 1986). 
When utility is a positive value, it is perceived 
by a rational actor (i.e., the person committ ing 
the activity) to be useful. When a utility is 
negative, a rational actor would perceive the 
object to be useless. The greater the positive 
value, the greater the usefulness. To calculate 
the utility of illegally importing and releasing 
wild hogs, we reviewed and summarized fi nes 
and penalties from various states regarding the 
illegal importation and release of wild hogs and 
Figure 1. Wild hogs are often introduced into areas for hunting, but can quickly spread to neighboring 
lands, such as this farmer’s corn fi eld in Lawrence County, Indiana. (Photo courtesy of USDA)
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examined the positive incentives for moving 
wild hogs, such as the cost savings from 
required travel to another state to legally hunt 
hogs. To demonstrate the application of using 
functions for estimating the likelihood of illegal 
behavior, we modeled the utility of an actor in 
Indiana, a state with small, widely dispersed 
wild hog populations and a law targeted to 
stopping illegal introductions of wild hogs.
Methods
To determine the potential negative 
incentives that currently exist to deter someone 
from moving wild hogs to new locations, 
we examined the laws and policies of state 
agencies responsible for managing wild hogs 
using Internet resources provided by state 
agencies from October 5, 2013 to March 15, 2014. 
Specifi cally, we searched for laws, policies, and 
fi nes that referenced the legality of possessing, 
hunting, trapping, transporting, or other 
activities regarding wild or feral swine and wild 
or feral hogs. In instances where information 
could not be obtained on the Internet, we called 
wildlife agencies in each state to determine the 
information. We recorded the maximum and 
minimum fi nes and jail terms when available. 
If minimum fi nes or jail terms were not listed, 
no data were recorded. When no information 
on fi nes or jail terms could be located, these 
states were excluded. Because of the multitude 
of common names for wild hogs, we also 
documented the use of common names used 
for free-ranging Sus scrofa.  
To determine the value of the positive 
incentives for translocating wild hogs, we 
recorded the cost of a single-day hog hunt. We 
examined Internet websites using a Google 
search for businesses off ering to guide or 
provide hog hunting services for a single-day 
hunt, exclusive of lodging, hunting permit fees, 
or other expenses to obtain a range of values 
to use in the model. We based our sample 
selection on the order of information presented 
in the search results, terminating the search 
once >75% of a page resulted in non-relevant 
or repeated results. We excluded results listed 
as paid advertisements. Within a given state, all 
businesses were included that met this criteria. 
When lodging, meals, or other expenses were 
included, we subtracted the costs of lodging 
listed on the site, or subtracted the costs for 
non-hunting observers. If a single-day hunt 
exclusive of other expenses could not be 
determined, that site was excluded. All prices 
were based on current (2015 U.S.$) price lists. 
We did not diff erentiate between captive and 
free-ranging wild hogs or between diff erent 
prices based on quality of the hog.
To calculate utility of translocating wild hogs, 
we used the following Expected Utility formula 
from Piliavin et al. (1986):
E(U) = (1 – p) U(y) + p U(y – F)
E(U) = the actor’s expected utility from a 
contemplated activity
p = likelihood of being punished in the 
activity
y = the anticipated returns (material or 
psychological) from the activity
F = the anticipated penalty resulting if the 
actor is punished for the activity
For the minimum value of translocating 
hogs to a location near the actor’s location, 
anticipated returns (y) are a function of the 
personal cost savings for having wild hog 
hunting near the actor’s home, as opposed to 
driving a considerable distance to hunt. Factors 
used to calculate the cost savings include the 
cost of the hunt (estimated above), cost of 
an out-of-state license, cost of gett ing to the 
location, and costs of lodging. We excluded 
other costs that would be incurred regardless 
of the location of the hunt, such as meals, guns, 
and ammunition.
Anticipated penalties (p) are the fi nes, 
potential imprisonment, and the resulting loss 
of revenue for time imprisoned estimated from 
the data collected above. We determined the 
likelihood of being punished (p) as a range of 
probabilities because we located no estimates of 
the likelihood of being caught and successfully 
prosecuted, although the likelihood of gett ing 
caught in a wildlife-related crime has been 
described as “slight” compared with other 
crimes (Nurse 2013). Eliason (2003) reported on 
several studies where deer poaching detection 
rates in 3 states were estimated to range from 
1.1% to 2.2%. We found no data on the likelihood 
of being caught and punished in Indiana for the 
importation and release of wild hogs; therefore, 
we calculated a range of values from 0.001 to 
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0.25 as an estimate for p.
We used the national average values for a 
single-day hunt and an estimate of other costs 
for overnight travel as cost savings for y, and 
the potential penalties as being the average fi nes 
for translocating wild hogs. However, because 
utility is site specifi c (i.e., needs to include 
estimates of distance traveled for additional 
cost savings, and potential loss of income for 
time spent in jail), we also provide an example 
of a utility calculation as case study for Indiana. 
Results
We found information for penalties related 
to the importation and/or release of wild 
hogs on the Internet for 5 states and collected 
additional information from 21 states by 
contacting the appropriate biologist or through 
returned phone calls, including from 2 states 
with information located on the Internet. We 
found legislation from 24 states that limit the 
release of hogs. Of those 24 states, each has 
the potential to assess fi nes as a penalty for 
the illegal release of hogs (Table 1). Several 
states did not explicitly state the 
level of the fi ne but assess them 
through the current criminal 
code or the judge or justice of the 
peace presiding over the case. 
Among states, the defi nition of 
a feral or wild hog can vary. We 
found that 48% of states based 
their defi nition of a feral or 
wild hog on the amount of time 
the animal has spent outside of 
captivity, while 30% of states 
had no specifi c defi nition. We 
found no information regarding 
a defi nition of wild hogs from 
22% of states.  Minimum fi nes 
per hog ranged from $0 to 
$10,000 with a median fi ne of 
$500 ( = $1,085, SE = $571, n = 17) 
and a mode of $1,000. Maximum 
fi nes per hog ranged from $50 
to $10,000 with a median fi ne of 
$1,500 ( = $2,708, SE = $576, n = 
20) and a mode of $5,000. Years 
in jail per hog ranged from 0 
years to 2 years with a median 
of 1 year ( = 0.7 years, SE = 0.2 
years, n = 11; Table 1).
We found data from 146 diff erent companies 
or individuals from 17 states off ering single-day 
hogs hunts (Figure 2). Prices of hunts varied 
greatly among states but appeared to be highest 
(1) where hogs are uncommon; (2) among states 
popular as a tourist destination, such as Hawaii; 
or (3) in states such as Tennessee, where hog 
hunting has been severely restricted by state 
law. Hunt prices ranged from $150 to $1,500 ( 
= $448, SE = 263, n = 146) with a mode of $500. 
There was considerable variation among states, 
but low variability within states (Figure 2). 
Based on the mean values for the minimum 
and maximum fi nes of $500 and $1,000, 
respectively, and an average cost of a wild hog 
hunt of $500, the likelihood of being punished 
would have to be 100% for the minimum fi ne to 
serve as a deterrent. For the average maximum 
fi ne of $1,000 to serve as a deterrent, the 
likelihood of being punished would have to be 
50%. The highest fi ne reported was $10,000. For 
this fi ne to serve as a deterrent, the likelihood of 
being punished would have to be 5%. Because 
the expected detection rate is low (likely <1%), 
Figure 2. Mean cost of single-day hog hunts in 2015 in 15 states as 
determined by a search of posted costs on the Internet by companies 
and individuals off ering wild hog hunts.  Cost estimates are for a 
single-day, single-hog hunt.
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Table 1. Fines and jail time reported by states or located on the Internet regarding the illegal importa-
tion and/or release of wild hogs into the environment collected from October 5, 2013 through March 
15, 2014.  In some cases, a minimum fi ne was not explicitly reported and was not assumed to be $0, 
but rather left blank. 
State Minimum
fi ne (US$)
Maximum
fi ne (US$)
Jail sentence 
(years)
Other measures
Arkansas 1,000 5,000 2 Penalties are per hog (jail term less on 
private land) 
Colorado 250 1,000 Penalties are per hog
Florida Judge sets all fi nes; no listed minimum 
or maximum
Georgia 1 1,000 Typically includes a 3-year loss of 
hunting privileges
Hawaii 1,000 1 Penalties are per hog
Idaho 200 5,000 1
Illinois Class A misdemeanor
Indiana Class D felony
Kentucky 500  1 Potential loss of hunting privileges
Maryland 0 All hogs are considered livestock
Massachusett s 50 Non-criminal citation of $50
Mississippi 2,000 5,000 0.013 Loss of hunting and fi shing privileges 
for 1 year
Missouri 1 5,000 1 Some have been sentenced for up to 
4 years in jail
Montana 1,000 Loss of hunting and fi shing privileges
Nebraska 100 Loss of hunting and fi shing privileges
New Hampshire Misdemeanor
New Jersey
500
1,000
1,000
2,500
5,000
For release of domestic hog
For release of Eurasian hog unknowing: 
4th degree criminal off ense
For release of Eurasian hog knowing: 
3rd degree criminal off ense
New York 500 1,000 Penalties are per hog; also loss of 
hunting privileges for a specifi ed term
North Dakota 5,000
Oklahoma 250 2,000 0.026
Oregon 250
1,000
For a misdemeanor charge
For a felony charge if tied with a 
violation of Lacey Act
South Carolina 500 0.12 Penalties are per hog
Texas 1 500 Fines set by Justice of the Peace
Wyoming 10,000 10,000 Penalties are per hog
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the fi nes would have to be >$50,000 to serve 
as an economic deterrent, assuming the total 
value for importing and releasing a wild hog is 
$500, or the average value of a hunt. 
To illustrate the usefulness of a utility model, 
it has to be applied in context, and the total 
benefi ts and costs determined. The total costs 
associated with a hunt are specifi c to each 
location (i.e., a person in northern Indiana 
may have to drive further for a legal hunt than 
a person in southern Indiana). The average 
income will also vary with location, which can 
infl uence the deterrent eff ect of incarceration. 
To illustrate this, we applied the formula to 
estimate the utility of translocating wild hogs 
to Indiana, a state with relatively few hogs, 
widely dispersed populations across the state, 
and a history of illegal introductions. Because 
costs vary depending on the home location of 
the actor, we estimated the total cost of a single-
day hunting trip from Indiana to central Florida, 
one of the closest states with large populations 
of hogs to hunt, easily located guide services, 
and low prices. For our Indiana actor, the total 
cost for the hunting trip, including 2 nights 
in a moderately priced hotel ($75 per night), 
1,800 miles round trip from Lawrence County, 
Indiana to central Florida in an average vehicle 
($180; 25 miles per gallon at $2.50 per gallon), 
and paying for a guide service ($276; Table 1), 
would be $531. 
In Indiana, a law that could be used to 
prosecute individuals who release wild hogs 
is the Animals Running At Large (Indiana 
Code [IC] 15-17-18-8). Under this law, illegally 
releasing hogs would be a class B misdemeanor. 
In Indiana, a class B misdemeanor could result 
in a fi xed term of imprisonment for ≤180 days 
and a fi ne of ≤$1,000 (IC 35-50-3-3). According to 
City-Data.com (htt p://www.city-data.com/city/
Bedford-Indiana.htm), the median household 
income in Indiana during 2012 was $33,039. 
Adjusting based on 2.8% infl ation, the 2015 
median household income would be $33,978. 
Assuming a 2-income household, an individual 
of that household would have a gross income 
of $326.71 per week. Assuming that the judge 
imposes the maximum fi ne of $1,000 and the 
maximum imprisonment penalty of 180 days, 
or 25 weeks of full-time employment, the total 
potential penalty would be approximately 
$9,167. However, based on past fi nes imposed 
for wildlife-related crimes, the likelihood of the 
maximum fi ne is low, with the likelihood of the 
maximum imprisonment term even lower.
Lawrence County, Indiana has a long history 
of wild hog releases (Caudell et al. 2013). 
Lawrence County is 1,171 km2. With only 2 
game wardens working in the county at any 
given time, the likelihood of being caught in the 
act of releasing wild hogs is relatively low and 
likely near 1%, similar to those for poaching 
of white-tailed deer (Odocoilus virgianus) 
discussed by Eliason et al. (2003). 
Using the Expected Utility formula (Piliavin 
et al. 1986) and a 1% chance of detection, the 
maximum fi ne and maximum time in jail would 
result in an expected utility from the illegal 
importation of wild hogs as $441. If expected 
utility is >$0, then there is a positive incentive 
for the illegal action. At a 1% detection rate, it 
would require a total fi ne of $53,100 to result 
in an economic deterrent. If the detection rate 
could be increased to 10%, then a total fi ne of 
$5,310 would result in an expected utility of 
$0; therefore, any increase in fi nes beyond this 
amount should result in a deterrent for the 
rational economic actor. 
Discussion
We found that most states have a variety of 
measures in place to reduce the likelihood of 
the spread or introduction of wild hogs. Even 
states currently without hogs have recognized 
that wild hogs are a potential threat and 
have laws in place to reduce the likelihood of 
introduction. However, in many cases, there are 
factors such as rates of detection that are likely 
to negate the eff ects of fi nes and penalties. 
The threat of jail, fi nes, and loss of hunting 
privileges represent negative economic 
incentives for moving wild hogs to locations 
where there are no wild hogs or where there are 
limited populations. However, for the rational 
economic actor, the negative incentives have 
to be weighed against the potential gain from 
importing wild hogs. For the casual, ethical 
hunter who is likely a law-abiding citizen, the 
threat of legal action may be enough to keep 
them within the bounds of most game laws. 
But someone who regularly engages in risky 
or illegal behavior either (1) weighs the cost 
of being caught against the likelihood of being 
caught and rationalizes that the potential gains 
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outweigh the benefi ts; (2) incorrectly assesses 
the actual risk of gett ing caught and, therefore, 
misinterprets the data; or (3) just does not care 
if they get caught or not (Cooter and Ulen 2011). 
We also saw a large diversity of fi nes 
associated with the laws regarding wild hogs. 
High fi nes can be an important part of a 
deterrent system for preventing illegal activity. 
However, fi nes have to be high enough to serve 
as an eff ective deterrent. Polinsky and Shavell 
(1991) discussed that for fi nes to be an eff ective 
deterrent, they have to be appropriate to the 
wealth of the individual committ ing the crime. 
Essentially, Polinsky and Shavell (1991) found 
that the greater the income of the individual, 
the greater the fi ne needs to be to serve as a 
deterrent. Most current fi nes will not serve 
as a deterrent in many cases when the factors 
of the Piliavin et al. (1986) utility function are 
considered. For fi nes to be more eff ective, fi nes 
or detection rates would need to increase. 
Increasing detection rates may mean that 
states use task forces or additional personnel 
in sting operations; however, this may be cost 
prohibitive for many states. Increasing fi nes or 
related penalties, if high enough, may achieve 
the same goal while maintaining costs at the 
current level. 
Garoupa (2001) argued that, ideally, the 
optimal fi ne for a deterrent encompasses the 
entire wealth of the individual. But because the 
size of fi nes will be ultimately limited by law, 
such as maximum fi ne sizes for a particular 
type of violation, more creative penalties 
may be needed. For an individual with litt le 
wealth, the real value they place on an item or 
a privilege, such as the privilege to hunt, could 
be used to serve as a deterrent when wildlife 
laws are broken. Recently, Kentucky revised 
its laws regarding the possession and release 
of wild hogs (Kentucky Revised Statutes [KRS] 
150.186bbb) so that the fi nes can include the 
forfeiture “of his or her right to hunt, fi sh, trap, 
or be licensed as a commercial guide for a period 
of 10 years” (KRS 150.990 Penalties). The loss of 
hunting privileges has the potential to serve as a 
signifi cant deterrent for the importation of wild 
hogs because of the value that people place on 
hunting. The value of hunting for a particular 
individual is unknown but has been estimated 
by examining the maximum collectable 
revenue and the total benefi t value (Martin and 
Gum 1978). However, it is likely that the value 
of hunting exceeds the cost of a hunting license 
for many people. For some people, hunting 
may represent their most valued recreational 
activity, and the loss of hunting privileges can 
represent an impact to an entire lifestyle. 
Based on the Piliavin et al. (1986) utility 
function, the likelihood of being punished can 
decrease the size of the fi ne needed to serve 
as an eff ective deterrent. This likelihood is a 
combination of the detection rate for the crime 
and the likelihood of prosecution. Moreover, 
the actor’s perception of being detected can 
increase the perception of being detected 
for the model. If an actor believes he may be 
detected more often than the actual likelihood 
of detection based on the number of law 
enforcement personnel, it should decrease 
his utility (Piliavin et al. 1986, Ehrlich 1972). 
Therefore, the use of tip lines and economic 
incentives, such as rewards, for reporting 
people who transport and release hogs, similar 
to the program implemented by the Tennessee 
Department of Natural Resources (Coil 
2014), may decrease utility. Eff ective tip lines 
combined with rewards increase both the actual 
and perceived chance of being caught releasing 
wild hogs. Just as fi nes have to be high enough 
to discourage people from breaking the law, 
rewards have to be high enough to encourage 
people to report neighbors, acquaintances, 
and others who break the law. While states 
may not have enough funds to provide large 
rewards, providing other incentives, such as 
lifetime hunting licenses or special hunting 
opportunities may be substantial enough to cost 
a state litt le in terms of funds or lost revenue. 
Having state biologists, agriculture agents, 
and other employees demonstrate vigilance 
about the transportation, possession, and 
release of wild hogs can also increase both 
the perceived and actual chance of detecting 
someone engaged in illegal hunting activities. 
Increasing the perception of being caught can 
magnify the size of the fi ne. For example, if a 
fi ne is $500, a person has to weigh the eff ect 
of that fi ne on their personal situation with 
the likelihood of gett ing caught. If $500 is a 
signifi cant amount, but if there is litt le chance 
of being seen by a relatively small number of 
law enforcement personnel, the person may 
decide the risk of gett ing caught is low and that 
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the rewards are large enough to outweigh those 
risks. However, if they believe their neighbors, 
the person at the gas station, or any passing 
state employee would report them, that can 
increase their perceived risk of detection and 
make them believe it is more likely that they 
will lose $500, making them less likely to take 
the chance of engaging in the illegal activity 
(Cooter and Ulen 2011).  
For laws to be successful deterrents, there 
must be a high likelihood that they can 
be successfully enforced; however, if laws 
are ambiguous, enforcing them becomes 
diffi  cult. Currently, there is no single, widely 
accepted common name for a free-ranging 
undomesticated Sus scrofa that populates the 
United States. The wild progenitor of some of 
the common domestic species is the wild boar 
of Europe, Asia, and North Africa (Sus scrofa), 
but a variety of common names are used for 
the North American free-living species of 
hog including feral swine, hog, and pig; wild 
swine, hog, and pig; razorback; Eurasian wild 
boar; and a myriad of other names. This can 
lead to confusion on the part of the general 
public, lawmakers, and those att empting to 
enforce laws (Gentry et al. 2004). Those who 
draft laws and regulations have to be conscious 
of the defi nition of terms used. For instance, 
several states have regulations that prohibit 
the transportation or capture of feral swine. 
Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary (<htt p://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/feral>)
defi nes the word feral as relating to or 
suggestive of a wild beast or not domesticated 
or cultivated; however, it also defi nes feral as 
an animal having escaped from domestication 
and becomes wild, which is often the defi nition 
that wildlife biologists will use to distinguish 
between native wild animals and those 
populations that are now wild but originated 
in captivity. Therefore, it could be argued 
that once a feral animal is in captivity, it is no 
longer feral and is a domestic hog rather than a 
feral hog. Even if the word feral is specifi cally 
defi ned in the law, a lawyer may be able to 
make a compelling argument. Free-ranging 
or wild might be more accurate terms for the 
common name because of specifi c defi nitions 
of wildlife under the law; even if wildlife is in 
captivity, it is still wildlife and not domesticated. 
Therefore, the name wild American hog might 
be more appropriate. An even clearer defi nition 
would be to use the scientifi c name for wild 
and domestic swine in laws regarding the 
management of wild hogs. Gentry et al. (2004) 
reported on a recent ruling of the International 
Commission on Zoological Nomenclature that 
specifi c epithet of domestic swine should be 
Sus domesticus because of the long history of the 
use of this name for the domesticated version of 
the wild hog species. While this does not assist 
with the identifi cation of species, it does make 
it easier for lawmakers to draft legislation. The 
use of Sus scrofa and Sus domesticus for wild and 
domestic swine, respectively, would provide 
a more accurate defi nition to keep the legal 
defi nitions distinct.
During our research, we found that states 
have a wide range of laws and policies 
regarding the management of wild hogs, and 
laws that prohibit hog hunting are probably 
one of the most cost-eff ective disincentives to 
the illegal importation of wild hogs. Att empts 
at legalized hunting have resulted in the 
signifi cant expansion of populations in both 
Tennessee and California because this provides 
unintended incentives to spread wild hogs to 
other parts of a state (Zivin et al. 2000, Bevins et 
al. 2014). We hypothesize that the reverse may 
true be if all hunting of wild hogs is outlawed 
because this type of law accomplishes several 
goals. Making it illegal to hunt hogs removes 
the incentive for hunters to move hogs to new 
areas. It also means that there is no chance that 
a hunting industry, such as guide services, 
could be established around hog hunting. If the 
law goes further to state that it is illegal to hunt 
any wild hog or any feral domestic swine, this 
can improve the chances for prosecution; the 
prosecuting lawyer does not have to prove that 
the hog is a particular species or breed because 
any hog that is taken during hunting would 
be illegal. Anyone caught in possession of a 
hog that appears to have been shot during the 
course of hunting could be fi ned. Unfortunately, 
there are also incentives other than economics 
resulting from the illegal importation of wild 
hogs, such as the enjoyment of a new animal 
to hunt outside of other hunting seasons or 
supplementing existing populations with new 
genetics in an eff ort to improve the population 
(Bevins et al. 2014). In addition to the incentives 
that hunters obtain from introducing hogs, there 
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are psychological incentives associated with 
criminal behavior, such as thrill seeking (Nurse 
2013), or ignoring a law that the perpetrator 
believes is unjust (Cooter and Ulen 2011). These 
other incentives may need to be researched and 
addressed through other means.
Management implications
The relatively simple model we presented is 
intended to give state agencies a starting point to 
evaluate the eff ectiveness of their own fi ne and 
punishment system for importing wild hogs. 
Other factors may need to be included based on 
the current laws and policies of any particular 
state. For instance, if it is legal to establish a 
guide service within a state for hunting wild 
hogs, that would add to the economic incentive 
for importing and releasing wild hogs. 
Perception of being caught and punished can 
be just as important of a deterrent eff ect as the 
actual penalties assessed for criminal behavior 
(Ehrlich 1972). For laws and their resulting 
penalties to serve as an eff ective deterrent for 
the translocation of wild hogs, they should be 
widely advertised. In most cases, we had to 
call the state agency to determine the illegality 
of transporting and releasing wild hogs and 
to determine potential fi nes. In these states, 
the actor may not be aware that the action is 
illegal, which does not serve as a deterrent. 
Using tip lines and rewards also have the 
potential to increase the perceived likelihood 
of being caught, assuming that the rewards 
for reporting illegal activity are high enough 
to serve as a deterrent. In addition, successful 
court cases resulting in high fi nes or jail terms 
should be widely publicized to enhance their 
deterrent eff ect.
Recreational hunting is often touted by 
hunters as being important in controlling 
the population. In populations where no 
active control or substantial control is being 
conducted, or where populations are already 
large, this may be the case. Timmons et al. 
(2012) estimated that if hunting were eliminated 
in Texas, feral hog populations would triple in 
5 years, which would, at fi rst glance, appear 
that hunting is an important part of the overall 
solution of managing wild hogs. While this 
may be true in large populations or where 
the landscape is saturated with wild hogs, in 
states where hogs are found in small numbers, 
encouraging or allowing recreational hunting 
by non-landowners can contribute to the 
anthropogenic spread of wild hogs. 
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